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Key Policy Points 
  Game Management Areas (GMAs) in Zambia aim to combine nature conservation with 
economic empowerment of rural households and communities. 
  We find evidence of consumption gains from living in GMAs and from participating in 
natural resource management through Community-Resource Boards (CRBs) and Village 
Action Groups (VAGs). 
  However, these benefits are unevenly distributed. Only GMAs with limited alternative 
livelihoods (Bangweulu and South Luangwa) exhibit significant consumption benefits. Also, 
the benefits accrue mainly to the relatively well off while the poor do not gain even if they 
participate.  
  Resources from ZAWA to CRBs seldom reach the VAGs. Richer, more educated community 
members participate at CRB or higher level while poorer households participate at VAG 
level. There is need to address impediments to effective participation by the majority of the 
community members. 
  Infrastructure development, which is more evident in Kafue and Lower Zambezi park 
systems, does not necessarily translate into household level consumption gains in the short 
run. Moreover, the observed infrastructure development in these areas cannot be attributed 
to the GMA institution. 
 
INTRODUCTION:  Game Management 
Areas (GMAs) in Zambia are buffer zones 
around national parks, in which licensed 
safari and subsistence hunting is permitted 
(ZAWA 2007). It is a communal area in 
which people live by semi-subsistence 
agriculture, coexisting with wildlife. The 
community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM) program allows 
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) to share 
hunting license revenue and wildlife 
management responsibilities with the 
communities living in GMAs (GRZ 1998). 
The communities allocate the revenues 
between employment of village scouts, and 
local infrastructure and developmental 
projects through Community Resource 
Boards (CRBs) and Village Action Groups 
(VAGs). The argument is that the resultant 
increased natural resource conservation will 
lead to increased tourism activity and private-
sector investment, leading to greater revenue 
for the communities and greater conservation. 
However, the increased wildlife population is 
bound to increase crop damage by wildlife, 
tsetse infestation, and other human-wildlife 
conflicts. In the end the impact of GMA 
policies on household welfare is the net effect 
of the benefits and costs associated with 
wildlife management. 
 
OBJECTIVES:   This policy brief 
summarizes a larger study which has the 
objective to determine the welfare effects of 
the GMA institution and of participation in 
CRBs and VAGs. The study also determines 
whether such benefits (if they exist) accrue 
more to the poorer segments of the 
communities, a hypothesis implicit in the 
establishment of the GMAs. We use 
consumption expenditure in the analysis as 
the welfare indicator. Broader measures of welfare based on education and health, which 
measure longer term non-economic benefits, 
may not be evident for the CBNRM program 
in the GMAs, which started relatively 
recently. 
 
DATA AND METHODS:  This study uses 
household and community data from the 2006 
“Impact of Game Management Areas on 
Household Welfare (IGMAW)” survey by the 
Zambia Central Statistical Office (CSO) with 
technical and financial support from the 
World Bank (WB), the Natural Resources 
Consultative Forum (NRCF), and ZAWA. 
The survey covered 2,769 households in 139 
communities in GMAs and other, control 
areas around national parks, selected through 
a two-stage stratified cluster sampling 
process. With the exception only of those in 
the north and north-western parts of the 
country, the rest of the national parks were 
covered. About half of the interviewed 
households were in treatment areas. The 
study also benefited from key informant 
interviews with tour operators, VAG and 
CRB committee members and ZAWA 
officials in the study areas. 
 
Many factors affect household welfare, 
including participation in the CBNRM 
program. Some of these factors also affect the 
household’s propensity to live in GMAs 
and/or to participate in the CRBs and VAGs. 
One of the important implications of selection 
bias is that the simple differences in average 
welfare between treatment and control 
households are not an accurate measure of 
impact (Ravallion 2001). We use joint 
estimation of outcome and treatment 
relationships (Maddala 1983; StataCorp 
2003) to consistently estimate the impact on 
consumption expenditure (for details, see 
Bandyopadhyay and Tembo 2010). 
 
RESULTS:  Although agriculture is 
generally the most important livelihood 
activity, it is relatively more important in 
non-GMAs, identified by 86 percent of the 
households (compared to 79 percent in 
GMAs). In contrast, GMAs exhibit more 
diversified off-farm income sources which 
include an impressive showing by the tourism 
sector. Evidence shows that, as expected, 
households in GMAs are significantly more 
likely to participate in community-based 
natural resource management through CRBs 
and VAGs than their counterparts in non-
GMAs, but have significantly less durable 
assets, are more likely to be female-headed, 
are less educated, and are further away from 
all-weather roads. However, unconditional 
descriptive statistics indicate that, 
statistically, the two strata are not different 
with respect to per capita consumption 
expenditure and access to basic schools and 
health centers. On average, a typical 
household has an annual per capita 
consumption expenditure of ZMK 846,000 




Table 1 presents treatment regression 
estimates of the average impact on household 
welfare of living in GMAs (Column 1), and 
the impact of participating in community 
resource management through CRBs and 
VAGs. On average, 66 percent of the 
consumption expenditure enjoyed by 
households in GMAs can be attributed to the 
GMA institution (Table 1). Though huge, 
these benefits were not possible to see with 
the unconditional mean comparisons 
discussed above. This is because GMA 
communities and households have other 
attributes (less wealthy, less educated, more 
remote, etc), which would make them worse 
off in the absence of the GMA interventions. 
Within the GMAs, those who participate in 
CRBs and VAGs have 44 percent more per 
capita consumption expenditure than they 
would have had had they not been 
participating (Column 2). 
 
However, these gains accrue only in GMAs 
around Bangweulu and Luangwa park 
systems. Households in these two park 
systems have proportionately more female-
headed households, less education, longer 
distances to all-weather roads and less 
livestock, which may imply less resources 
                                                           
1 Average exchange rate in 2006 was 1 USD = 3600.00 
ZMK. 
 
Page 2 and alternative economic opportunities. Thus, 
they are more likely to depend on natural 
resources and to seek benefits from the GMA 
institution. This may explain the greater 
migration pressure and participation in 
community-based organizations, including 
CRBs and VAGs.  
 
Table 1. Treatment Regression Estimates 
of the Impact of Being in GMAs and of 






         (1)          (2) 
  -------------  (%) ----------- 
Bangweulu 72.9***    85.8*** 
Kafue -44.4    -28.6 
Lower Zambezi  -36.2    49.4 
Luangwa 74.4***    53.0*** 
Overall 66.5***    43.8*** 
Significance: *= 10 %; **= 5 %; ***= 1 % 
Notes:  1) Impact estimated as the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT) using per capita consumption 
expenditure as the outcome variable 
 
The significance of these factors is that they 
are different in Bangweulu and Luangwa as 
compared with Kafue and Lower Zambezi, 
and may explain part of the observed 
differential impacts. Surprisingly, Kafue and 
Lower Zambezi park systems have greater 
infrastructure development activity.
2 
However, after controlling for wealth, 
community size, frequency of meetings by 
the leadership, number of droughts during the 
10 years prior to the survey, distance to all-
weather roads, nongovernment organization-
funded projects in the community, and labor 
contribution by the community, the impact of 
the GMA institution on the age of new 
infrastructure disappears.
3 This implies that 
the observed infrastructure developments may 
have been facilitated by processes outside of 
the GMA institution. 
                                                           
2 The average age of the newest infrastructure in Kafue 
and Lower Zambezi park systems was between 2 and 5 
years, compared to 8-10 years in Bangweulu and 
Luangwa. 
3 Full results of both the treatment regressions and 
other auxiliary regression models such as this are not 
reported here due to space limitations. Interested 
readers are referred to Bandyopadhyay and Tembo 
(2009). 
The impact of the GMA institution is also 
non-uniform with respect to the household’s 
initial asset wealth. The impact of the GMA 
institution as well as participation in CRB and 
VAG activities on per capita consumption is 
large and positive but only for the households 
in the top two quintiles of the value of 
consumer durable assets (Figure 1). About 
54-60 percent of per capita consumption 
expenditure among non-poor participating 
households are associated with the GMA 
institution and participation in community-
based natural resource management activities.  
 
However, the GMA and participation effects, 
though positive, are not significant in the 
asset-poor category. The results do not 
change even if the asset-poor category is 
redefined to include the bottom three quintiles 
of the value of assets. Therefore, the GMA 
institution does not necessarily benefit the 
poorest in the community.  
 
Figure 1. Heterogeneous Impact of GMAs 
and Participation in CRBs and VAGs on 































Notes:  1) Impact estimated as the average treatment effect 
on the treated (ATT) ;  2) Significance: *= 10 percent; **= 5 
percent; ***= 1 percent 
 
One of the explanations for the heterogeneous 
impacts is that participation in community 
resource management is in levels. The 
powerful, who often are more enlightened, 
richer, and closer to traditional power 
participate more actively in the CRBs and 
ZAWA meetings. Discussions with 
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community stakeholders indicate that such 
active members can even access CRB funds 
as loans.  
 
Blunt misappropriation of CRB funds has 
also been reported in a number of active 
CRBs (Mulenga 2003; Astle 1999). At the 
other end of the participation continuum, the 
poorer and less powerful members of the 
communities only attend local meetings in 
their respective VAGs. Conversations with 
community members suggest a clear disjoint 
between the CRBs and their member VAGs. 
Therefore, resources from ZAWA seldom 
trickle down to the VAGs. Mulenga (2003) 
cites weak community participation and 
information sharing regarding community 
entitlements as major constraints. 
 
CONCLUSIONS:  We find substantial gains 
associated with living in GMAs and 
participating in CRBs and VAGs. However, 
these gains are unevenly distributed, accruing 
mainly in remote park systems with limited 
alternative economic activities and among the 
relatively richer households. Other things 
being equal, the poor and non-poor 
households are equally likely to participate in 
CRBs and VAGs. However, the nature and 
degree of participation varies between the two 
groups.  
 
While the non-poor households participate 
close to the ZAWA-supported CRB 
resources, the poor are largely passive 
participants in their VAGs. Elite capture of 
the benefits from GMAs cannot be ruled out, 
given the unclear links between CRBs and 
VAGs. Historically powerful national 
institutions like ZAWA and local elites have 
vested interests in maintaining the status quo 
in revenue sharing.  
 
These and other impediments to effective 
bottom-up resource management need to be 
understood and addressed. Clearly, the 
existing model, in which ZAWA shares the 
revenues through CRBs, and in which the 
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